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u.s.

Law and Space Technology:
Land Remote Sensing
by
Richard DalBello*
U.S. Congress
Office of Technology Assessment

Significant role in space activities, the international coordination of space activities through
domestic law and international agreements will
continue to be essential to protect common interests and to ensure that special interests are
dealt 'Wi.th in a common frame~rk.

ABSTRACT
The opporttmity for private sector investment in space technology has increased dramatically in very recent times. The commercialization
of this technology places new stresses not only
on the technical skills of nations, but also on
their legal and political institutions.
New
technologies such as remote sensing, ~ich are
inherently global in their effect, suggest the
need for laws and legal institutions ~ich have a
similarly global perspective.
Yet, the commercialization of space technology remains a highrisk, long-term endeavor.
If the private sector
is to have a meaningful role in the development
of this technology, such laws and regulations
must also be sensitive to the realities of the
marketplace.

Recently, the U. S. Congress passed legislation designed to encourage the divelopment of a
private remote-sensing industry.
This paper
examines this legislation and the means by ~ich
it seeks to ensure that private activities are
conducted safely and in accord 'Wi.th international
legal principles.
This paper also discusses the
effect that commercial space ventures may have on
future international cooperative agreements involving space technology.
Private-Sector Activities and International Law

In the past, most space technologies ~re
developed and operated by governments; therefore,
limited attention was given to the means to regulate private-sector activities.
In the United
States, wi th the exception of satelli te communications, the legal and regulatory frame~rk for
most commercial space activities is not yet in
place.

As the role of private industry varies within each of the nations of the WJrld, and as it is
those nations and not their private industries
~ich enter into international space agreements,
it is understandable that some confusion exists
as to the legal status of private industry in
outer space.
This discussion will examine some
of the legal issues that arise Wien trying to fit
the activities of private enterprise into a
frameWJrk designed primarily to regulate the
actions of states.

This paper examines the effect that privatesector remote-sensing activities might have on
the international community and on the future of
international cooperation in space. It describes
in detail "The Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984" recently passed by the U. S.
Congress and signed by the President.
The paper
concludes that it is possible to develop domestic
regula tions that balance the economic needs of
the private sector with the legal and political
concerns of the international community.

In the United States, it has been consistent
Government policy to encourage the involvement of
private enterprise in its space programs.
When
President Eisenho~r annotmced his ~ministra
tion's space policy in 1960, he stated:
(T)o achieve the early establishment
of a communication satellite system which
can be used on a caalErcial basis is a
national objective Wiich will require the
concerted capabili ties and funds of both
Goverrment and private enterprise ••• I
have directed the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration ••• to advance
the needed research and development and
to encourage private enterprise to apply
its resources tOWlrd the earliest practical utilization of space technology for
caalErcial civil caamunications requirelEnts. (emphasis added)

Introduction
Space technologies, because they involve
activities that do not generally respect national
boundaries, place new stresses on traditional
international legal principles.
These principles, based as they are on the rights and powers of territorial sovereignty, often do not
supply sufficient direction for the use of new
space systems.
In order to resolve the complex
legal problems that have arisen in the space age,
nations, both technologically advanced and developing, have relied on international cooperation.
As private firms begin to play a more

* This paper is based, in part, on a repo rt by the
Office
of
Technology Assessment,
International
Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space
Activities.
Ho~ver, the views expressed here are
not necessarily those of the Office of Technology
Assessment, the Technology Assessment Board, or the
individual members of Congress.
This paper is declared a work of the U.S.
Government and therefore is in the public domain.
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before
proceeding
with any
such
activity."
Article IX's requirement that the international
consultation shall precede the proposed activity
is quite significant because it imposes an active
duty to regulate rather than a passive duty
merely to supervise.
Under Article IX, a state
has a
duty to
interfere wi th or prohibit
altogether potentially harmful activities by its
nationals at least until such time as the effects
of the proposed activity are made kno~ to the
international community.

This enthusiasm for private enterprise was
not shared by all nations.
In 1962, the Soviet
Union submitted to the Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) a "Draft Declaration
of the Basic Principles Governing the Activities
of States Pertaining to the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space."
It was suggested in the draft
that, "All activities of any kind pertaining to
the exploration of outer space shall be carried
out solely and exclusively by States ••• ,,3
The
United States responded to this position by
pointing out that pursuant to U. S. policy, as
reflected in the Communications Satellite Act of
1962, private firms had already been given the
right to engage in space activity. This conflict
was resolved by an agreement that states would
bear the responsibility for space activities
~ether such activities w;!re carried out by the
state or its nationals. 4 In this manner, private
activities
could
be
controlled,
albeit
indirectly, through international regulation.

The Outer Space Treaty does not attempt to
direct states as to how these responsibilities
should be carried out. This is appropriate since
a state's control over its nationals involves
complex questions of domestic law Wlich are not
easily
addressed
in
the
context
of
an
international treaty.
One of the more important attempts to delineate the responsibilities of states in outer
space was the 1972 "Convention on Internation:!1
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects."
This Treaty extends the concept of state responsibility to include the concept of liability for
damage caused by space objects.
Article II of
the Liability Treaty establishes the principle
that a launching state is absolutely liable for
"damage caused by its space object on the surface
of the earth or to aircraft in flight."

The principle of state responsibility for
the actions of its nationals is incorporated in
both Arficles VI and IX of the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty.
Although the Outer Space Treaty does
not specifically grant or deny private industry
the right to undertake profit-making activities
in outer space, the U.N. debates on this subject
make
it
clear
that
such
activities
w;!re
contemplated by the drafters.

T"!.O IXlints should be mentioned here. First,
the 1972 Liability Convention grants neither
rights nor responsibilities to nongovernmental
entities.
Under Article VIII, if the nationals
of a launching state cause damage, it is the
state damaged, ~ich "may present to a launching
State a claim for compensation." A second IXlint
of interest concerning the Liability Convention
is the fact that it applies, by its terms, only
to "launching States"
~ich
are defined in
Article I as:

Given that private enterprise may conduct
activities in space for profit if the appropriate
state will take responsibility for such actions,
it becomes necessary to examine the nature of
this responsibility.
Some authors, in analyzing
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, have
suggested that a state's responsibilities are
extensive: 6
• •• (W)hile no one would doubt the need
for government control over space activity at its present stage, the second
sentence of Article VI would prohibit, as
a matter of treaty obligation, strictly
private, unregulated activity in space or
on celestial bodies even at a time ~en
such private activity becomes most common
place.
Although the terms "authorization" and "continuing supervision" are
open to different interpretations,
it
would appear that Article VI requires a
certain minimum of licensing and enforced
adherence to government-imposed regulations.

(i)
(ii)

A State which launches or procures the
launching of a space object;
A
State
from
~ose
territory
or
facility a space object is launched;

Under this scheme, if state A launches a
space object for the nationals of state B, both
states are considered launching states and have
joint liability for damage under Article V of the
Liabili ty Convention.
This is the case even
though under the language of Article IX of the
Outer Space Treaty it is state B that bears the
international resIXlnsibility for the "potentially
harmful" activi ties of its nationals.
This
problem is someWlat alleviated by Article V of
the Liability Convention ~ich allows a state
that has paid compensation for damages
"to
present a claim for indemnification to other
participants in the joint launching."

As is discussed below, U.S. adherence to the
principles of "authorization" and "continuing
supervision"
is clearly demonstrated by the
remote-sensing legislation recently passed by the
U.S. Congress.
In
addition
to
Article
VI's
general
statement of responsibility, Article IX of the
Outer Space Treaty requires that if a state or
its nationals are going to undertake any activity
in space ~ich "would cause potentially harmful
interference with activities of other States"
then the state planning the activity "shail
undertake appropriate international consultation

These rather complex international remedies
are presently "!.Orkable only because it is the
activities of states and not individuals that
predominate in space. As this situation changes,
new international legal remedies that more fully
comprehend the role of the individual in space
activities will have to be developed.
These
legal remedies will, no doubt, be influenced by
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the laws and regulations developed by states to
regulate the activities of their nationals.

development,
operation,
and
follow-on system to Landsat.

Re~ulation

in

of Private Remote-Sensing Activities
he Onlt€CrStates

a

1)
How will the United States ensure
private-sector compliance with existing treaties
and international agreeaents to 1iIhich the United
States is a party? Article VI of the Outer Space
Treaty makes states responsible for the actions
of nongovernmental entities in space and requires
the "authorization" and "continuing supervision"
of such activities.
Article IX of the Outer
Space Treaty requires a country to undertake
"appropriate international consultations" be fore
it or its nationals commence activities in outer
space that may cause harmful interference wl.th
the activities of other signatories of
the
Treaty.

In
1979,
the
responsibility
for
the
operation of Landsat WlS transferred from NASA to
the Comme rce Department's Na tional Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
NOAA WlS
chosen to operate Landsat, in part, because it
already had responsibility for, and experience
with, the U.S. meteorological satellites.
Though
NOAA WlS given interim operational control of the
Landsat program,
the ul tima te goal of
the
transfer WlS to facilitate the transition of both
the space and grougd segments of the systEm to
the private sector.

The Remote-Sensing Act recognizes that: 11

Although competition is the normal mode of
industrial organization in the United States,
regulations are often used to ensure that commercial activities neither jeopardize the health and
safety of the general public nor conflict wi th
international obligations.
This preference for
limi ted,
though
essential,
regulation
is
reflected in the recent Congressional legislation
related to private remote-sensing activities.
This legislation offers a clear example of how
the U.S.
Government intends
to satisfy the
"authorization"
and
"continuing
supervision"
provision of Article VI of the Outer Space
Treaty.

Government oversight must be maintained
to assure that private sector activities
are in the national interest and that the
international commi tments of the United
States are honored;
In order to comply wi th Articles VI and IX
of the Outer Space Treaty, the Act requires that
remote-sensing operators
be licensed by the
Secretary of Commerce and grants to the Secretary
the power to develop appropriate regulations.
Section 401 (b) of the Act states:
No license shall be granted by the Secretary unless the Secretary determines in
writing that the applicant will comply
wi. th the requirements of this Ac t, any
regulations issued pursuant to this Act,
and any applicable international obligations •••

In
June
1984,
after
considerable
deliberation the U. S. Congress passed "The Lan~
Remote-Sensi~ Commercialization Act of 1984."
Two of the primary purposes of the Act 1iIere to: 10

o

of

The drafters of this legislation realized
that the transfer of remote sensing to the
private sector would raise a number of important
international legal and policy questions.
It is
useful to examine some of these questions in
order to see how they have been addressed in the
legislation.

When the first Landsat remote-sensing satellite
WlS
launched in July 1972, the U.S.
Government owned and operated, through NASA, both
the space and ground segments of the system.
Since that time there have been four additional
Landsat satellites launched.
Landsat 5, the
current and last satellite in this series, WlS
launched in March 1984.

o

ownership

guide the Federal Government in achieving
proper involvement of the private sector
by providing a framework for phased commercialization of land remote sensing •••
maintain the United States' worldwide
leadership in civil remote sensing, preserve its national security, and fulfill
its international obligations •••

Section 403 (1) gives the Secretary the
authority
to
"grant,
terminate,
modify,
condi tion, transfer, or suspend" licenses if the
licensee fails to comply wl.th the prOvisions of
the Act.
Section 403 (3) gives the Secretary the
po1iler to impose penalties, including monetary
penalties, for noncompliance with requ\~ements of
the license or applicable regulations.
On all
matters affecting international obligations, the
Secretary of Commerce is to consult wl.th the
Secretary
of
State,
Who
is
given
the
res ponsibili ty for determining Wia t conditions
are essentif1 for meeting these international
obligations.

The Act provides for the comme rcializa tion
of land remote sensing in two distinct phases.
During the firs t phase of the comme rcializa tion
process, the Secretary of Commerce is directed to
contract with a private firm to market data from
the current Landsat system.
During this phase
the U.S. Government, through the Department of
Commerce, retains res ponsibili ty for the orbit,

Article VI I of the Outer Space Treaty and
Article II of the Liability Convention make signatories absolutely liable for space activities
Wlich cause damage or injury to the persons or
property of other states. The United States will
continue to be liable under the provisions of
these two treaties Wlen a private firm owns and
operates
the
entire
remote-sensing
system.

data collection, and eventual disposition of the
satellites and ground systems used to operate the
Lands at
sys tEm.
The second phase of
the
commercialization process is a 6-year transition
to a privately owned and controlled land remotesensing system.
In this phase, the Secretary of
Commerce is directed to contract for private
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degree of economic or scientific development."

Although the Act does not require the private
operator to indemnify the Government in case of
accident, section 402 (3) does make the granting
of
a
license
dependent on the applicant's
Willingness, upon termination of operation, "to
dispose of any satellites in space in a manner
satisfactory to the President."
This presumably
may alleviate some of the problems associated
With space debris or uncontrolled reentry of
spacecraft.

The U. S. Congress also Wlnted to ensure
fairness
in
the
distribution
of
privately
generated remote-sensing data.
To this end,
section 601 of the Act requires that unenhanced
da ta "be made available to all users on a
nondiscriminatory
basis"
and
that
"prices,
policies,
procedures,
and
other
terms
and
condi tions"
of
da ta
sales
be
publicly
available.
Commenting on this secti~n of the
legislation, the Senate Report states: 1

The 1974 Convention on the Registration of
Objects Launched into Outer Space requires, among
other things, that the date, territory of launch,
orbital parameters, and function of space objects
be registered wi th the Secretary General of the
United Nations.
Although the remote-sensing
legislation does not specifically mention th*
Registration
Convention,
the
Senate
Report
accompanying
this
legislation
states,
"The
Committee intends for this responsibility, in the
case of land remote-sensing satellites, to be
carried out by the Secretary of Commerce. ,,14

What the (Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation) does not find acceptable is the sale of a single copy of an
original scene to the highest bidder.
Such an action wuld transfer the proprietary control of the da ta from the
operator to the purchaser and wuld be in
direct conflict with the principle of
nondiscriminatory access to data
Commenting on the importance of the requirement to make public inforllBtion concerning the
ava ilabili ty of data apd the terms of sale, the
House Report observes:1~

2)
Wi th 1ihat data distribution policies
1dll private owners be required to comply?
In
the past, the United States has followed a policy
of nondiscriminatory distribution of unenhanced
data.
This means that data must be made
available to all purchasers under the same terms
of sale.
Congress WlS aWlre that a private
operator might find that, in some cases, the
value of remotely-sensed data might be increased
if purchasers could get exclusive access to this
information.
For example, oil or other resource
management companies might pay a high price for
exclusive geological information.
However, the
Act states instead that, "the broadest and most
beneficial use of land remote-sensing data will
result from maintaining 9. policy of nondiscriminatory access to data. "I:>

It is the intent of the (House Committee
on Science and Technology) in adopting
these provisions to prevent any data
purchaser from acquiring proprietary or
de facto proprietary control over remotesensing data.
Since de facto proprietary
control wuld result if only one potential data purchaser ~re aWlre of a particular service, the Committee intends
that all sales policies ••• be generally
advertised in the user community
3)
What relationship liQuld a private firm
have 1dth foreign governments, particularly those
1dth Landsat receiving stations?
At present,
fore ign ground stations are all ollDed by local
goverrments; they receive data directly from the
Landsat sa telli tes by agreement with the U. S.
Goverrment.
Some of the agreements ~ich ~re
or iginally entered in to by NASA have recen tly
been renegotiated by NOAA.
Under the NASA
agreements, foreign ground stations could, for a
nomi nal fee, receive and preprocess these data
and sell data products to their OllD customers if
they agreed to abide by the nondiscriminatory
sales policy practiced by the United States. The
NOAA agreements are essentially the same except
that they contain a provision that states they
shall remain in effect "for a period of three
years
or until NOAA no longer retainS
management responsibility for the Landsat system
••• ,,20
When management responsibility is passed
to the private sector, negotiations for new
remote-sensing
earth
stations
and
the
renegotiation of old contracts will be handled by
the private-system operator.

The Senate Report explains this language: 16
During the Committee's Landsat hearing, the issue Wl s raised that adherence
to the
principle of nondiscriminatory
access to data was not in the best interest of a commercial entity ••• The Committee is sensitive to this issue ••• The
Commi ttee feels, however, that the benefits from such a commercial enterprise
pale in comparison with the benefits to
the United States of maintaining allegiance to the princi pIe of nondi scr iminatory access to data.
Addressing this same issue, the Report of
the House of Representatives notes that continued
adherence to the principle of nondiscriminatory
access to data is necessary to fulfill the international obligations of the United States. 17 The
House report recalls Article I of the Outer Space
Treaty ~ich holds that space activities "shall
be carried out for the benefit and in the
interest of all countries irrespective of their

*

Reports of the House of Representatives and of the Senate concerning
legislation do not have the status of law.
They do, however, offer useful
guidance into the meaning of specific provisions and of the legislation as a
whole.
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Congress
~s
aware
that
"the
active
participation of the private sector in matters so
closely related to diplomatic negotiations is not
easily compatible with the culture and protocol
of many foreign countries. ,,21
Therefore, it ~s
the intention of the Remote-Sensing Act to
provide a gradual transition between the present
period of government-to-government relationships
and the future situation in which the private
sector will become a negotiating party.
To
accomplish this, section 201 of the Act states
that title to all portions of the current Landsat
system will be retained by the United States
Government.
Section 205 states that the U.S.
Goverrment will remain the party of primary
responsibility in dealing with foreign governments until the expiration of the existing contracts.
The private firm chosen to market the
remote-sensing data during the first phase of the
transi tion to commercialization will ac t as the
agent of the U.S. Government. After the termination
of
existing
contracts,
the
private
contractor will be allowed to negotiate new
contracts
as
long
as
they
provide
for
nondiscriminatory marketing. The House Report on
the remote-sensing legislation de~~ribes the
twofold benefits of this arrangement:

and
"nondiscriminatory
distribution"
policies
will be continued when the remote-sensing system
is transferred to the private sector.
Section 607 of the Remote-Sensing Act does,
however, introduce some flexibility into these
U. S.
posi tions.
This section outlines the
responsibili ties of the Secretaries of State and
Defense for identifying relevant international
commitments
and
security
concerns
and
for
communicating
them
to
the
Secretary
of
Commerce.
These commitments and concerns must be
taken into account in any licensing action of the
Secretary.
The House Report on the remotesensing bill acknowledges that, "In some cases,
these concerns will necessitate that ~pecial
limitations be imposed on the license. ,,2
The
report notes that potential limitations might include "limitatf~ns on resolution or geographical
restrictions."
Similarly, the Senate Report
states
that,
"private
remote-sensing
system
operators
may
be
required
to
alter
their
operations due to unanticipat~d national security
or international
concerns." 5
Although
the
Remote-Sensing Act does not change current U.S.
policy with regard to data acquisition and
distribution, section 607 does provide a lIEans by
Which such changes could be instituted.

First,
the Government
will have the
opportunity to observe the performance of
a private-sector party in dealing with
foreign entities while it maintains substantial
oversight
responsibilities.
Second, foreign governments will have the
opportunity to become accustomed to dealing wi th a private-sector
party while
maintaining diplomatic relations with the
owner and operator of the system (i.e.,
the United States government). Thus, the
plan will provide both data continuity
and ease of transition to foreign users.

5)
How lIlll the U. S. Goveronent allocate
broadcast frequencies for private remote sensing
activities?
Section 606 of the Remote-Sensing
Act requires the President to make available to
the private sector frequencies presently reserved
for U.S. Government use. This section of the Act
also requires that, "The spectrum to be '"
made
available
shall
conform
to
any
applicable
international radio or wire treaty or convention,
or regulation annexed thereto."
Wi thin 90 days
after the Pres iden t takes action, the Federal
Communication Commission (FCC) is directed to
authorize these frequencies for nongovernllEntal
use.

4)
How lIl11 the U.S. Goveronent respond to
the po I i tical and econanic concerns that some
countries have about remote-sensing activities?
The possession of remotely-sensed data and the
a bili ty to analyze them have the potential to
affect the economic and political interests of
other countries.
For this reason, some countries
feel that their prior consent should be obtained
before their territory is sensed.
Other nations
feel that they should be assured access to data
concerning their own resources and that there
should be limits placed on the transfer of these
data to third parties.

In order to operate the radio facilities necessary for remote-sensing activities, a private
operator must file an application with the FCC in
accordance wift the rules of the Communications
Act of 1934.
The FCC is also authorized to
gran t
addi tional
frequencies
should they be
needed
for
future
comllErcial
remote-sensing
activities.
The Act requires that additional
frequency allocations must be in the public
interest and consistent with t~ international
obligations of the United States.

While
the U.S.
Government operated
the
Landsat system, it maintained a policy of "open
skies" for data acquisition and a policy of
nondiscriminatory access for data distribution.
In the view of the U.S. Government, the "open
skies" policy is supported by Article I of the
Outer Space Treaty which states, "Outer Space •••
shall be free for exploration and use by all
States without discrimination of any kind
"

Private Sector Space Activities and
International coopera~
Space
technology
has
long
provided
an
example of successful international cooperation;
however, as commercial space activities increase,
economic competition could begin to limit the
opportunities for cooperative activities.
A
diminution
in
cooperative
activities
could
adversely effect some developing countries.

Similarly, the policy of nondi scr imina tory data
distribution is supported by Article XI of the
Outer Space Treaty which encourages states "to
the greatest extent feasible and practicable" to
inform the Secretary General of the U. N., the
public, and the scientific community of the
results of space activities.
The "open skies"

In August 1982, the Second U.N. Conference
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE
'82) met in Vienna, Austria.
This conference
emphasized the need for the transfer of space
technology
from
developed
to
developing
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